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SEARCH & SEIZURE-The Clash Between the Fourth Amendment
and Society's Interest in Effective Law Enforcement. State v.
Welch, 873 P.2d 601 (Wyo. 1994), reh. denied (1994).

The Fourth Amendment's prohibition against unreasonable searches
and seizures' and society's interest in effective law enforcement have

clashed in the courts of the United States since the amendment's adoption
in 1791. The Wyoming Supreme Court's 1994 decision in State v. Welch2
demonstrates that the conflict endures today.
The case involves an interlocutory appeal by the State of a trial
court's order suppressing evidence in a drug prosecution. 3 Without referring to its adopted standard of review of evidentiary rulings, 4 the Wyoming Supreme Court rejected the finding by the trial judge that a Wyoming Highway Patrolman did not have reasonable suspicion to detain two
travelers on Interstate 80 while he awaited the arrival of a drug-sniffing
dog. 5 The court held that the trial judge erred in suppressing evidence
obtained by a search of the vehicle occupied by Joseph Michener Jr. and
James Welch, 6 and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent
with its opinion.7
Patrolman Dan Dyer was traveling westbound near Laramie when he
encountered a pickup, driven by Michener, traveling in the opposite
1. The Fourth Amendment provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall
issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
2. State v. Welch, 873 P.2d 601 (Wyo. 1994).
3. Id. The authority of the court to review evidentiary rulings pursuant to a writ of certiorari
was settled in City of Laramie v. Mengel, 671 P.2d 340 (Wyo. 1983). See also State v. Heiner,
683 P.2d 629, 632-33 (Wyo. 1984) (granting review of a trial judge's order suppressing evidence
critical to the prosecution of an arson case).
4. In regard to evidentiary rulings, the court has said that the trial judge's "findings must be
given great weight when considered in light of its opportunity to hear and observe the witnesses."
Garcia v. State, 777 P.2d 603, 606 (Wyo. 1989). The court defers to the trial court's evidentiary
rulings "absent appellant's clear showing of an abuse of that discretion." Id. at 607.
The ultimate issue in determining abuse of discretion is "whether or not the court could reasonably
conclude as it did. A reviewing court cannot substitute its judgment for that of the trial court, whose judgment must be sustained unless clearly erroneous, manifestly wrong, or totally against the evidence." Roberts
v. Vilos, 776 P.2d 216, 217 (Wyo. 1989). See ifra notes 128-32 and accompanying text.
5. Welch, 873 P.2d at 605.
6. Id.
7. As of Nov. 1, 1994, the Michener and Welch cases remained at pretrial stages.
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direction. 8 Welch was asleep in the pickup's cargo bed, which was covered by a topper.9 Dyer mistakenly thought the pickup was traveling in
tandem with a cream-colored car without license plates."0 Dyer turned his
vehicle around in the median and began following the two vehicles." He
discovered the car had a temporary sticker in the back window, which
alleviated his concern about the lack of license plates.' 2 Nevertheless, the
pickup failed to signal one hundred feet before switching lanes to pass a
semi-truck and repeated the traffic code violation in returning to the right
lane.' 3 Dyer stopped the pickup and asked Michener for his driver's
license and vehicle registration.' 4 He told Michener he was going to issue
him a warning ticket for an illegal lane change.' 5 By the time Dyer
reached his patrol car to write the ticket, he had decided to detain
Michener and Welch until a canine drug detection team could arrive on
the scene from Laramie. 6 Approximately six minutes after the initial
stop, Dyer asked the dispatcher to send the so-called "sniffer dog" to the
scene. 7 The dog arrived approximately 43 minutes after the stop began.' 8
The investigatory stop stretched to approximately 50 minutes before the
dog alerted the officers to 347 pounds of marijuana hidden beneath the
liner in the pickup bed.' 9
Observations that raised Dyer's suspicion included:
1) The pickup had nylon webbing for a tailgate and a topper
without a door-a combination that Dyer said struck him as
unusual, as the topper would negate any improved gas mileage usually afforded by using nylon webbing for tailgate.2"
2) The pickup bed was "quite clean," with no spare tire.2'

8. Welch, 873 P.2d at 602.
9. A topper is a small camper shell that covers the cargo department of a pickup. A plastic
covering lined the inside of the cargo department bed of the pickup driven by Michener. Id.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. WYo. STAT. § 31-5-217(b) (1994) provides:
A signal of intention to turn right or left when required shall be given continuously
during not less than the last one hundred (100) feet traveled by the vehicle before turning.
14. Welch, 873 P.2d at 602-03.
15. Id. at 603.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Id.at 603-04.
20. Id.at 602.
21. Id.
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3) The cab contained a "fist-size clove of garlic" and a radar
detector."
4) A Miramar Naval Station sticker was on the window, though
the driver did not look to Dyer like the "military type."'
5) The driver mispronounced Suaso, the Spanish name of the
registered owner who was not present, though a traffic ticket
Dyer discovered with the registration indicated that he had
driven the pickup more than a month before. Dyer said he
knew the correct pronunciation because he speaks Spanish.2
6) The pickup was registered in San Diego, and Southern California is a major drug source for narcotics coming into the
United States. 2 5
7) Michener appeared nervous and his nervousness increased
during the stop.' 8
8) Welch, on the other hand, remained asleep, or at least feigned
sleep, while continuing to lie in the bed of the pickup for a
time after the stop. Dyer said most passengers awake quickly when their vehicles are stopped.'
10) The ceiling of the pickup topper sagged an inch or two, indicating to Dyer that narcotics might be hidden there.2
The Wyoming Supreme Court agreed with the trial judge's ruling that
the initial stop was not pretextual, and that Michener and Welch were not
free to leave and, therefore, were "seized" by Dyer throughout the encounter.29 However, the court disagreed with the judge's ruling that Dyer lacked
reasonable suspicion to justify the detention beyond the traffic stop.3"
This casenote will examine the court's finding of reasonable suspicion in the light of precedent of the United States Supreme Court as well
as other courts. It will also critique the Wyoming Supreme Court's decision to overturn the suppression order despite its standard practice of
deferring to trial judges' evidentiary rulings.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.

Id.
Id.
Id. at
Id. at
Id.
Id.
Id. at
Id. at
Id.

602-03.
603.

602.
604.
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BACKGROUND

In Terry v. Ohio,3' the United States Supreme Court first authorized
police to conduct investigative detentions of individuals based on reasonable
suspicion." Reasonable suspicion isa lesser standard 33 than the probable
cause' required to justify a full-blown arrest, but the Court has declined to
specifically define it.35 A Terry stop must be "minimally intrusive."36 In
determining the lawfulness of a Terry stop, a court must balance the
individual's privacy interests against the state's interests in law enforcement.37
Terry called for a two-fold inquiry into the reasonableness of a limited search
or seizure-whether the officer's action was justified at its inception and
whether it was "reasonably related in scope to the circumstances which justified" it in the first place.3" An officer must offer more than an "inchoate and
unparticularized suspicion or 'hunch."'39 In United States v. Cortez, the
Court emphasized that investigative stops must be evaluated on "the totality
of the circumstances-the whole picture."' The Terry doctrine has been applied to investigative detentions of vehicles and their occupants such as the
one conducted by Patrolman Dyer in Welch.4

31. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968). The Court said police officers "must be able to point to
specific and articulable facts which, taken together with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant" an investigative detention. Id. at 21.
32. The Court explained that Terry allowed police to "stop and briefly detain a person for
investigative purposes if the officer has a reasonable suspicion supported by articulable facts that
criminal activity 'may be afoot,' even if the officer lacks probable cause." United States v. Sokolow,
490 U.S 1, 7 (1989).
33. The "level of suspicion [required] is considerably less than proof of wrongdoing by a
preponderance of the evidence." Sokolow, 490 U.S. at 7.
34. The Court has held that probable cause means "a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found." Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238 (1983).
35. Reasonable suspicion is not "readily, or even usefully, reduced to a neat set of legal
rules." Sokolow, 490 U.S. at 6 (quoting Gates, 462 U.S. at 238.).
36. United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 704 (1983).
37. Id. at 703. The Court said:
The exception to the probable-cause requirement for limited seizures of the person recognized in Terry and its progeny rests on a balancing of the competing interests to detem-ine the
reasonableness of the type of seizure
.... We must balance the nature and quality of the intrusion on the individual's Fourth Amendment interests against the importance of the governmental
interests alleged to justify the intrusion. When the nature and extent of the detention are minimally intrusive of the individual's Fourth Amendment interests, the opposing law enforcement interests can support a seizure based on less than probable cause.
Id.
38. Terry, 392 U.S. at 19-20.
39. Id.at 27.
40. United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417 (1981).
41. United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675 (1985). "The Fourth Amendment is not, of course,
a guarantee against all searches and seizures, but only against unreasonable searches and seizures.
The authority and limits of the Amendment apply to investigative stops of vehicles such as occurred
here." Id. at 682 (emphasis in original).
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The Supreme Court has declined to establish a bright line rule regarding
the permissible duration of a Terry stop, opting instead for a "common
sense" approach. 2 The Court in United States v. Sharpe chose to focus on
the due diligence of police rather than the length of the stop and rejected a
per se rule that a twenty-minute detention was too long to be justified under
the Terry doctrine. 43 The Court held that such a bright-line approach was
"clearly and fundamentally at odds with our approach in this area."" The
Court acknowledged, however, that the length of the stop is an "important
factor," and that "at some point" an investigative stop can no longer be
justified by reasonable suspicion as opposed to probable cause.45 Once an
investigative stop becomes "in important respects indistinguishable from traditional arrest" it must be justified by probable cause.' A court's evaluation of
police diligence should not be swayed simply by the availability of a less
intrusive alternative, but "whether the police acted reasonably in failing to
recognize or to pursue it." 47
The protection against unreasonable searches and seizures found in the
Wyoming Constitution" is "virtually identical to that found in the federal
constitution. " "' The Wyoming Supreme Court adheres closely to "federal interpretations of the Fourth Amendment" absent contrary direction from the
state legislature." The Wyoming court summarized its view of Terry stops in
Keehn v. Town of Torrington." A law enforcement officer "may temporarily

42. In Sharpe, the Court held that "our cases impose no rigid time limitation on Terry stops ....
Much as a 'bright line' rule would be desirable, in evaluating whether an investigative detention is unreasonable, common sense and ordinary human experience must govern over rigid criteria." Id. at 685.
The Wyoming Supreme Court declined to adopt a "bright line" rule requiring written consent for searches following traffic stops. Welch, 873 P.2d at 604-05.
43. Sharpe, 470 U.S. at 686. The Court said:
In assessing whether a detention is too long in duration to be justified as an investigative
stop, we consider it appropriate to examine whether the police diligently pursued a means
of investigation that was likely to confirm or dispel their suspicions quickly, during which
time it was necessary to detain the defendant. A court making this assessment should take
care to consider whether the police are acting in a swiftly developing situation, and in such
cases the court should not indulge in unrealistic second guessing.
Id. (Citations omitted).
44. Id.
45. Id. at 685.
46. Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 212 (1979).
47. Sharpe, 470 U.S. at 687.
48. WYO. CONST. art. 1, § 4 states:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects
against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated, and no warrant shall issue
but upon probable cause, supported by affidavit, particularly describing the place to be
searched or the person or thing to be seized.
49. Saldana v. State, 846 P.2d 604, 611 (Wyo. 1993).
50. Id.
51. Keehn v. Town of Torrington, 834 P.2d 112, 116 (Wyo. 1992).

Published by Law Archive of Wyoming Scholarship, 1995

5

Land & Water Law Review, Vol. 30 [1995], Iss. 1, Art. 13
LAND AND WATER LAW REVIEW

Vol. XXX

detain an individual for the purpose of investigation only when he has a reasonable suspicion, based on all the circumstances, that criminal activity 'may
be afoot.' "52 Such detentions "are limited in both scope and duration. Peace
officers are encouraged, if not constitutionally obliged, to employ 'the least
intrusive means reasonably available to verify or dispel the officer's suspicion
in a short period of time."' ' 3
In State v. Wilson, decided nine days before Welch, the Wyoming
Supreme Court stated that a person "has been 'seized' within the meaning
of the Fourth Amendment only if, in view of all the circumstances surrounding the incident, a reasonable person would have believed that he
was not free to leave. "I The court also cited "the accepted standard" that
an officer making a traffic stop may check to determine if the car has
been stolen, but may not detain the motorist further for questioning about
other matters without reasonable suspicion.5" The standard is nearly identical to the standard adopted by the United States Court of Appeals for the
Tenth Circuit.56
In summary, the Wyoming Supreme Court follows federal precedent
in permitting investigative stops. The stops must be minimally intrusive
and supported by reasonable suspicion based on the totality of the circumstances observed by the law enforcement officer.
PRINCIPAL CASE
The majority opinion in Welch reversed the trial court's order suppressing evidence obtained by Patrolman Dyer during the detention of Welch and
Michener.57 Justice Cardine filed a dissenting opinion in which Justice Gold-

52. Keehn, 834 P.2d at 116 (quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 30).
53. Keehn, 834 P.2d at 116 (quoting Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 500 (1983)).
54. State v. Wilson, 874 P.2d 215, 220 (Wyo. 1994).
55. Id. at 224. The court said:
The accepted standard is that an officer making a traffic stop may request a driver's license
and registration, run a NCIC computer check to determine if the vehicle is stolen and the
license is valid and issue a citation. After these conditions are satisfied, however, the
officer must have a reasonable suspicion of illegal activity to justify further temporary
detention for questioning.
Id. (citations omitted).
56. See United States v. Soto, 988 F.2d 1548, 1554 (10th Cir. 1993). See also United States

v. Pena, 920 F.2d 1509, 1514 (10th Cit. 1990) (holding that if a "driver produces a valid license and
proof of right to operate the vehicle, the officer must allow him to continue on his way without delay
for further questioning.")
57. Welch, 873 P.2d at 602. Chief Justice Macy wrote the court's opinion, in which Justice
Thomas joined. Justice Taylor filed a concurring opinion. Justice Macy's term as chiefjustice expired
in July 1994 and Justice Golden succeeded him.

https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/land_water/vol30/iss1/13

6

Moats: Search & (and) Seizure - The Clash between the Fourth Amendment a
1995

CASENOTES

en joined.58 The court held that the detention of Michener and Welch was not
unreasonable in any respect. 9 First, the court concluded the initial stop "was
not pretextual but was lawful in all respects."' It then found that the
"patrolman's actions at the scene" showed that Michener and Welch were
"seized" and not free to leave. 6 However, the court held that the investigatory detention itself was justified by "reasonably articulable suspicion premised
upon objective facts" indicating the vehicle contained contraband.62 The court
further ruled that the detention of Welch and Michener took no longer than
was necessary for law officers to complete their investigation.63 The opinion
acknowledged that each of Dyer's observations, taken individually, might be
as consistent with innocence as it was with guilt. However, the court embraced "the doctrine that even conduct which is wholly lawful and seemingly
innocent may form the basis for a reasonable suspicion that criminal activity
is afoot."61 The Wyoming Supreme Court deferred to Patrolman Dyer's
experience in drug cases.' Dyer had been involved in eight Operation Pipeline67 interdiction arrests prior to his detention of Welch and Michener. 6 The
court said Dyer did not attribute his suspicions to his training in drug courier
profiles but he "credited his knowledge of, and experience with, similar
arrests where, in fact, circumstances such as those he observed that day were
correctly put together to form reasonable articulable suspicions."'69
After finding that Dyer had reasonable suspicion to detain the passengers, the court examined "the critical question" of whether the duration of
the detention violated the constitutional rights of Michener and Welch.' 0 The
court pointed to Sharpe7 to support its ruling that the fifty-minute detention
of Welch and Michener did not transform the investigative stop into a de

58. Id. at 606. Justice Cardine has since retired from the court.
59. Id.at 605.
60. Id. at 604.
61. Id.
62. Id.at 605.
63. Id.
64. Welch, 873 P.2d at 604.
65. Id. The court cited United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 6-8 (1989), as support for
the doctrine. The United States Supreme Court in Sokolow said that "any one of [the factors
considered in the case was] not by itself proof of any illegal conduct and is quite consistent with
innocent travel. But we think taken together they amount to reasonable suspicion." Id. at 9.
Sokolow, 490 U.S. at 9.
66. Welch, 873 P.2d at 604.
67. The Wyoming Highway Patrol's drug interdiction program is sometimes referred to as
Operation Pipeline. Brief for Respondent Michener at 1, State v. Welch, 873 P.2d 601 (Wyo. 1994)
(No. 92-192) [hereinafter Brief for Respondent Michener].
68. Welch, 873 P.2d at 604.
69. Id. at 604-05.
70. Id. at 605.
71. United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675 (1985).
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facto arrest. The majority held that the law enforcement officers involved
acted as quickly as possible to dispel their suspicions.' The nearest "sniffer
dog" available to Dyer was at the home of an Albany County Sheriff's deputy twenty-five miles west of Laramie.7" The court reasoned that the distance
between communities in the state render it impossible for law enforcement to
resolve its suspicions within a few minutes.74
Though the majority did not specify which of Dyer's observations it
found persuasive in establishing reasonable suspicion, Justice Taylor did
list in his concurring opinion the facts that he believed justified the detention. He cited the sagging ceiling of the camper shell and the unusually
clean plastic liner in the pickup bed as supporting "a reasonable inference
that contraband could be hidden in the vehicle."75 Justice Taylor specifically noted that the clean liner suggested that it been recently removed,
and he added that it "showed signs of having been altered." 76 Other
articulable facts mentioned by Justice Taylor were Michener's nervousness, Welch's "unusual indifference" and Michener's mispronunciation of
the pickup owner's name.' Finally, Justice Taylor concluded, "Police
experience would also indicate that the average interstate traveler does not
carry a fist-sized clove of garlic in a vehicle to present an aromatic challenge to prying noses, human or canine."78
Justice Cardine's dissent bluntly disputed the majority's finding of
reasonable suspicion. He succinctly summarized what Dyer knew before
deciding to detain Welch and Michener:
He then observed a pickup with camper and net tailgate, a clove of
garlic, a radar detector, a clean bed, the pickup was from San Diego, California, with a driver too nervous and a passenger too calm
(asleep in the pickup bed). That is all. This scenario does not constitute a drug profile nor reasonable suspicion of criminal activity.79
Justice Cardine concluded that the decision "opens the door for the willy
nilly use of drug courier profiles" by law enforcement officers in Wyo72. Welch, 873 P.2d at 605.
73. d. Albany County Sheriff's Deputy Rob DeBree drove 100 mph in order to reach the
scene with his dog as soon as possible. Id. at 603. The policeman had his wife leave their home with
the dog and meet him on the road to Laramie. Brief of the State at 6, State v. Welch, 873 P.2d 601
(Wyo. 1994) (Nos. 92-191, 92-192).
74. Id. at 605.
75. Id. at 612.
76. Id. The majority's opinion does not specifically state that theliner showed signs of tampering.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 610.
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ming. He asked how many innocent travelers will be searched by a canine
unit because they fit someone's idea of a drug courier. He then answered
his own question: "Since it is usually the guilty who end up before us, we
are unlikely to ever know. Is
ANALYSIS
A court may rely on an officer's experience and expertise in determining when a series of otherwise innocent acts together create reasonable
suspicion of criminal activity. However, if the acts in their totality are
consistent with innocent behavior, then a court should not find the officer
had reasonable suspicion. The specificity requirement implicit in the
Fourth Amendment mandates that an officer pinpoint why his observations of otherwise innocent acts cause him to suspect criminal activity. By
rejecting generalized suspicion and requiring specificity, the courts protect
innocent citizens from needless searches and seizures.
Reasonable people, viewing the cold record of Welch, could differ as
to whether the details that Dyer observed painted a picture consistent with
innocent travel or drug trafficking. The close call should have prompted
the Wyoming Supreme Court to defer to the trial court's finding that
Patrolman Dyer lacked reasonable suspicion.81
A. Separating the Innocentfrom the Suspicious
Profiles based on an officer's experience can help establish reasonable suspicion, but courts should not blindly accept them. Instead, courts
should subject profile characteristics to careful scrutiny.
Courts have generally afforded "considerable deference to the
observations and conclusions of an experienced officer, reasoning that
she can infer criminal activity from conduct that seems innocuous to a
lay observer. " ' 2 In Cortez, the U.S. Supreme Court said, "Long before
the law of probabilities was articulated as such, practical people formulated certain common-sense conclusions about human behavior;
jurors as fact finders are permitted to do the same-and so are law
enforcement officers." 83

80. Id. at 611.
81. The court also rejected a "bright line" rule announced by the trial court that written consent must be obtained for searches pursuant to traffic stops. Id. at 610. Justice Cardine would have
upheld the rule. Id. That debate, however, is beyond the scope of this casenote.
82. Evelyn M. Aswad etal., Project, Twenty-Third Annual Review of Criminal Procedure:
United States Supreme Court and Court of Appeals 1992-1993, 82 GEO. L.J. 622, 625-26 (1994).
83. United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 418 (1981).
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The Welch court followed the reasoning of United States v.
Sokolow' by deferring to the experience of Patrolman Dyer, though he
may have used his drug profile training in deciding whether to detain
Welch and Michener. The Sokolow court held that while a court must
require an agent to articulate the factors leading to reasonable suspicion, "the fact that these factors may be set forth in a 'profile' does
not somehow detract from their evidentiary significance as seen by a
trained agent." 8
However, the Sokolow Court did not halt its analysis at that point,
but continued its examination to determine whether the profile characteristics cited by the officers in the case, when taken together, were inconsistent with innocent travel.' Thus, Sokolow did not endorse reflexive acceptance of suspicions based on profiles. Rather, it required courts to
apply to profile-based suspicions the same careful scrutiny as in all other
Terry-type cases. Sokolow plainly does not relieve courts of their responsibility to insure that generalized suspicion by police does not needlessly
ensnare innocent travelers.
The Court of Appeals of New Mexico illustrated this requirement by
calling for more than generalized suspicion in a recent case involving an
investigative search of a gang member.' The New Mexico court rejected
a claim of reasonable suspicion based on two officers' experience "that a
gang member, at any given time, is possibly engaged in a narcotics or
weapons violation, or both." 89 The officer, however, had nothing connecting the individual defendant to a particular crime or crimes, except the
likelihood that he was a gang member.' A similar approach by the Wyoming Supreme Court might alleviate Justice Cardine's concern that innocent travelers will be searched "because they exhibit innocent conduct
which fits someone's idea" of a drug courier profile. 9 The Welch court
should have gone beyond deferring to Dyer's experience' and analyzed
whether the drug profile characteristics drawn from his past arrests pointed with specificity to the criminal activity in this particular case.

84. United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 10 (1989).
85. Welch, 873 P.2d at 604.
86. Sokolow, 490 U.S. at 10.
87. The Sokolow Court "held that government agents had reasonable suspicion to detain a
traveler matching five characteristics common to drug couriers which, when considered together.
were not consistent with innocent travel." Aswad, supra note 82, at 628.
88. State v. Jones. 835 P.2d 863, 867 (N.M. Ct. App. 1992).
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Welch, 873 P.2d at 611.
92. See supra notes 66-64 and accompanying text.
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Because the Welch court did not require such specificity, Justice
Cardine was correctly concerned that innocent travelers will be needlessly
subjected to canine searches as a result of the court's ruling. The number
of innocent travelers subjected to searches on Wyoming highways cannot93
be determined because the Highway Patrol does not keep such statistics.
However, statistics compiled from other drug interdiction programs demonstrate that significant numbers of innocent travelers are caught in the
nets when police trawl the highways and airports with generalized drug
profiles.' Circuit Judge Pratt noted in his dissent in United States v.
Hooper' that DEA agents testified that during 1989 they had detained 600
suspects at the Buffalo, N.Y., International Airport but arrested only
ten. 96 In another case, agents surveilling a Buffalo bus station admitted
that they stopped eighty passengers each month who fit their courier
profile, but arrested only four.' Similarly, a study of police testimony
"demonstrates that apparently only a small percentage of travelers stopped
in profile investigations are arrested."98
93. Telephone interview with Major Gary Marsden, the Wyoming Highway Patrol's Field
Operations Officer (Aug. 30, 1994). Marsden said patrolmen are not required to include a fruitless
search in their written reports unless unusual elements call for its mention. Id.
94. Paul Finkelman, The Second Casualty of War. Civil Liberties and the War on Drugs, 66 S.
CAL. L. REV. 1389, 1429 (1993) (quoting United States v. Miller, 821 F.2d 546, 550 (11th Cir. 1987) as
stating that "common sense suggests" many innocent travelers will be harassed when police use profiles).
95. United States v. Hooper, 935 F.2d 484, 499 (2d Cir. 1991) (Pratt, J., dissenting).
96. Id. at 500. Judge Pratt concluded his dissent: "It appears that they have sacrificed the
Fourth Amendment by detaining 590 innocent people in order to arrest ten who are not-all in the
name of the 'war on drugs.' When, pray tell, will it end? Where are we going?" Id.
97. United States v. Montilla, 733 F. Supp. 579, 580 (W.D.N.Y. 1990).
98. Morgan Cloud, Search and Seizure by the Numbers: The Drug CourierProfile and Judicial
Review of Investigative Formulas, 65 B.U. L. REV. 843, 876 (1985).
Investigations cited by Cloud include:
In one case at Chicago's O'Hare Airport, the court calculated that only 3-5 percent of the
suspects stopped were arrested. United States v. Moya, 561 F. Supp. 1, 4 (N.D. IlI. 1981) affd, 704
F.2d 337 (7th Cir. 1983).
In another case, a DEA agent's testimony indicated that only 16-20 percent of the individuals
involved in airport profile encounters over two and one-half years were arrested. United States v.
Cantero, 551 F. Supp. 397, 398 (N.D. Ill. 1982). In contrast, a local officer involved in the Cantero
case testified that suspects were seized in about 25-37 percent of her 200 narcotics encounters during
the same period. The testimony was consistent with the agent's testimony in an earlier case that she
had made 50 stops leading to 10 arrests at O'Hare airport. United States v. Black, 675 F.2d 129, 131
(7th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1068 (1983) (her co-officer claimed success in two out of
three seizures.) But cf. State v. Kennedy, 609 P.2d 438, 440-41 (Or. App. 1980), rev'd, 624 P.2d 99
(Or. 1981) (Portland officer successful in four out of four profile cases).
In a LaGuardia airport case, a DEA agent estimated that approximately 60 percent of the
persons identified as having "profile" characteristics were found to be carrying drugs. Florida v.
Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 526 n.6, (1983) (Rehnquist, J.,dissenting) (citing United States v. Price, 599
F.2d 494, 501 n.8 (2d Cir. 1979)).
Cloud points out that data from a case that has twice been cited in United States Supreme
Court decisions is somewhat misleading and still indicates that drug profiles do not accurately distinguish drug couriers from innocent people. In United States v. Van Lewis, 409 F. Supp. 535, 539
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Courts, as Justice Cardine points out, rarely hear from these
innocent subjects of drug searches. Headlines are made when a drug
courier has his conviction overturned because his Fourth Amendment
rights were violated. However, rarely do innocent travelers caught in
the net assert their rights because they probably lack the "time and
resources to return to the state to sue an officer who harassed them. ""
Therefore, courts must be even more careful to remember that the
reasonable suspicion cases before them set the standards for search of
"Everyman."' ° As Justice Marshall said in his dissent in Sokolow:
"Because the strongest advocates of Fourth Amendment rights are
frequently criminals, it is easy to forget that our interpretations of such
rights apply to the innocent and the guilty alike."' 10 ' The Terry Court's
command that courts require that officers have "specific and
articulable facts" was designed to insure that the innocent and their
Fourth Amendment rights are not trampled in the march against crime.
The Court saw the demand for specificity by police as the "central
teaching of this Court's Fourth Amendment jurisprudence.""

(E.D. Mich. 1976), aff'd, 556 F.2d 385 (6th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1011 (1978), the
government reported that 141 people were searched during 96 encounters. Drugs were found in 77 of
the searches and 122 people were arrested. Cloud points out that the figures do not include people
who were stopped but not searched and not all travelers fitting the profile were stopped. The sample
included some cases where information was derived from other independent police work and tips, so
the officers were not limited to their observations at the scene in determining whom to search. The
data was cited by Justice Rehnquist in his dissent in Royer, 460 U.S. at 526 n.6, as indicating the
"success" of the drug profile. Justice Powell favorably referred to the figures in his concurrence in
United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 562, (1980). Cloud, at nn. 135-37.
99. Finkelman, supra note 94, at 1430. The author points to the lawsuit by Joe Morgan, a
former major league second baseman, member of the Baseball Hall of Fame, and Oakland, California, businessman as a rare exception. A plainclothes Los Angeles detective looking for a companion
of a suspected drug courier wrestled Morgan to the floor, handcuffed him and placed his hand across
Morgan's mouth as he led him away before a gathering crowd. The officer testified he was looking
for a black man who was nervous and had "other characteristics of a narcotics courier." Morgan was
innocent of any involvement. His lawyer argued that the incident "happened to Joe Morgan, but it
really is applicable to any black person who uses Los Angeles airport . . . . If it wasn't Joe, this
could have happened to me or my father or to any other black person." Id. at 1429-30.
100. Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 181 (1949) (Jackson, J., dissenting). Justice
Jackson argued that "a search against [a suspect's] car must be regarded as a search of the car of
Everyman." Id.
101. Sokolow, 490 U.S. at 11. (Marshall, J., dissenting).
102. Terry, 392 U.S. at 21 n.18. In the footnote, the Court cites a long history of its cases that
outline the particularity requirement: Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 96-97 (1964); Ker v. California,
374 U.S. 23, 34-37 (1963); Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 479-84 (1963); Rios v. United States, 364 U.S. 253, 261-62 (1960); Henry v. United States, 361 U.S. 98, 100-02 (1959); Draper
v. United States, 358 U.S 307, 312-14 (1959); Brineger v. United States 338 U.S. 160, 175-78
(1949); Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 15-17 (1948); United States v. Di Re, 332 U.S. 581,
593-95 (1948); Husty v. United States, 282 U.S. 694, 700-01 (1931); Dumbra v. United States, 268
U.S. 435, 441 (1925); Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 159-62 (1925); Stacey v. Emery, 97
U.S. 642, 645 (1878).
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B. Specificity and Dyer's Observations.
The observations Patrolman Dyer listed as creating the suspicion that
Welch and Michener were transporting contraband must be examined in
light of the Fourth Amendment's requirement that they point with specificity to criminal conduct.
The owner of the pickup was from Southern California, a known
source of narcotics for the country. 03 Millions of people live in Southern
California, and certainly the great majority do not deal in drugs. "Source
cities," according to profiles espoused by law enforcement, include nearly
every major city and many medium-size cities in the United States.
Therefore, this profile characteristic can point an accusatory finger at millions of Americans.
Dyer thought it "quite strange" that the liner in the pickup bed
was clean and he could see no spare tire in the bed. "°It makes less
sense for someone running drugs to travel without a spare than it does
for the ordinary vacationer because the drug runner would want to
avoid the police contact that becoming stranded might bring. Even
granting that cleanliness may be unusual when it comes to pickup
beds, an officer developing reasonable suspicion must draw a connection between such cleanliness and the transportation of drugs. If Justice Taylor is correct in his assertion that the liner showed signs of
having been altered, that fact might lead a reasonable person to suspect
that something was hidden beneath the liner."' Courts have found reasonable suspicion where officers have noticed differences in the design
of vehicles that suggest hidden compartments. 10 7
Dyer observed that the ceiling of the topper hung down an inch or
two in the center. Unlike the cases cited above that involved alterations in
103. Welch, 873 P.2d at 602-03.
104. United States v. Glover, 957 F.2d 1004, 1017 (2d Cir. 1992). Chief Circuit Judge Oakes
pointed out in his dissent:
Any Lexis or Westlaw search would reveal that "source cities" include every city with a
population of over one million, most cities with over 500,000, and numerous cities with
only over 100,000 inhabitants. Thus, millions of people arrive at various points of destination from source cities, so-called, yet they can hardly be subjected to virtually random seizures from the fact of their departure therefrom.
Id.
105. Welch, 873 P.2d at 602.
106. See supra note 76 and accompanying text.
107. See United States v. Betancur, 24 F.3d 73, 75-76 (10th Cir. 1994). The court found the
officer had reasonable suspicion to detain Betancur after the officer observed that Betancur's pickup
was higher than normal for a two-wheel drive while the bed was lower than normal and the rear
wheel area was bright with fresh, clean undercoating. Id.
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vehicle design, the sagging ceiling could be simply explained by age or
hard use. Justice Cardine points out in his dissent that no drugs were
found in the topper's ceiling.' 8o
Dyer was also struck by the fact that the pickup had a Miramar
Naval Station sticker on the window though Michener did not look like
the "military type."" ° This should not have raised Dyer's suspicions
because he quickly learned that the vehicle did not belong to Michener." 0
Michener mispronounced the owner's Spanish name-not particularly surprising as Michener did not speak Spanish."' Even if one grants
that Michener's ignorance of the reportedly correct pronunciation raises
suspicion, the question is: suspicion of what? It might imply that
Michener had stolen the vehicle and only knew the owner's name because
he read it on the registration. However, the majority's opinion does not
indicate that Dyer detained Michener and Welch because he then suspected them of stealing the vehicle. In addition, Dyer did not contact Suaso to
determine exactly how he pronounced his name. 2
Driving a pickup with nylon webbing and a topper might not enhance your gas mileage," 3 but it hardly seems to indicate anything about
drug running. In fact, given that Dyer based much of his suspicion on
what he saw inside the bed, a drug runner would be smarter to keep a
metal tailgate on his pickup. The reasons that might explain the combination of nylon webbing and a topper are too numerous to mention, but
examples include that an owner no longer had the tailgate to put back on
the pickup, or that he was too lazy to put the tailgate back on when he
installed the topper.
Dyer was also struck by Michener's nervousness and Welch's apparent nonchalance in remaining in the pickup bed." 4 A month before Welch,
the Tenth Circuit confronted similar circumstances in United States v.
Fernandez."' In Fernandez, an investigating officer confronted a nervous
driver. The court, however, discounted the driver's nervousness as a

108. Welch, 873 P.2d at 607.
109. Id. at 602.
110. Id.
111. Id.

112. Brief for the Respondent Michener, supra note 67, at 6.
113. Welch, 873 P.2d at 602. Dyer "testified that he had never seen both a topper with no door
and nylon webbing for a tailgate used as a combination. . . ." Id. Dyer reasoned that the combination was out of the ordinary because the topper "would negate that normal purpose" for the webbing-increased gas mileage. Id.
114. Id. at 603.

115. United States v. Fernandez, 18 F.3d 874 (10th Cir. 1994).
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factor in raising suspicion. "Nervousness," the court explained, "is of
limited significance in determining reasonable suspicion" as it is "comto exhibit nervousness when
mon knowledge that most citizens" are likely
16
questioned by law enforcement officers.
Fernandez, the nervous driver, also had a passenger, Mr. Blanch, in
his vehicle when he was stopped. Blanch reacted in much the same manner as Welch-he remained asleep-for a time." 7 The arresting
patrolman's suspicions were raised when Blanch suddenly awoke during
the stop and appeared startled upon seeing the trooper."' He sat rigidly
throughout the rest of the encounter.119 A comparison of the suspicions
articulated by the officers in Welch and Fernandez indicates that a passenger will be deemed suspicious whether he sleeps or rests unaffected by a
traffic stop, or whether he awakens suddenly upon hearing the trooper
and his startled nerves render him rigid. What, then, may an innocent
passenger do to avoid suspicion?
The arresting officers in the Welch and Fernandez cases also both pointed to intuitive feelings that swept over them during their respective traffic
stops. However, the courts in the two cases differed in the conclusions they
drew from the feelings reported by the officers. The Fernandez court found it
significant that the trooper making the stop testified that his "sixth sense" and
the "tension in the air" made him suspect something was amiss.' 20 The court
found that his testimony "strongly suggests he was acting more on an
unparticularized hunch than on reasonable and objective suspicion."' 2 '
Though the Wyoming Supreme Court did not mention it in its opinion,
Patrolman Dyer testified to experiencing deja vu when he stopped

Michener. 122 Michener wore a baseball cap and the vehicle had a radar detector-two elements also present in an earlier stop in which Dyer had uncovered narcotics. " While it might be argued that deja vu at least has the ad-

116. Id. at 879. The Welch court's opinion does not say that Dyer tried to question Welch while
he was lying in the pickup bed.
117. Id. at 875.
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. Id. at 881 n.5.
121. Id. at 880.
122. Dyer testified in the suppression hearing:
A radar detector by itself doesn't mean much, but when also I had seen another traffic stop
just like this, with a guy named Foot, he was coming out of Tucson, he had a ball cap on
just like Mr. Michener, radar detector, I just thought I was talking to Mr. Foot again, it
seemed like deja vu, I had already been there once before.
Brief for Respondent Michener, supra note 67, at 2. (quoting transcript of August 3, 1992, Suppression Hearing at 30).
123. Id.
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vantage of being based on experience rather than a mere "sixth sense," deja
vu still does not supply "reasonable" suspicion. Suspecting that a person is
transporting drugs because he wore a baseball cap and had a radar detector
seems more akin to an "inarticulate hunch." In summarizing its conclusion in
Fernandez, the Tenth Circuit said, "At no time did [the investigating officer]
attempt to justify the continued detention of Fernandez based on any specific,
objective factors supporting a reasonable inference that the truck was stolen,
that the defendant was trafficking in drugs or that he was committing any
other criminal offense." l" The same could be said for Dyer, except for his
last observation-the garlic hanging in the cab.
Drug traffickers use a variety of substances to mask the smell of
narcotics. Garlic is one such substance, albeit not a particularly common one.I" Though Dyer testified that he recalled no garlic odor
because the clove had not been crushed,126 an innocent explanation,
such as belief in the healing powers of the herb, seems implausible
under the circumstances of the case. In any event, basing reasonable
suspicion on the presence of the garlic poses only a small threat that
an innocent traveler would be subjected to an unreasonable search or
seizure. The garlic, taken together with Dyer's other observations,
might suggest to the reasonable person that drugs were hidden in the
vehicle. It certainly makes for a close call.
C. Courts under pressure to enlist in the war on drugs.
If the case does, in fact, present a close call, then the Wyoming
Supreme Court may be criticized for failing to defer to the trial judge
who had the benefit of observing the witnesses. Astonishingly, the
court's opinion does not even mention the standard of review it usually
applies to evidentiary rulings."r Evidentiary rulings of a district court

124. Fernandez, 18 F.3d at 880.
125. A computer search revealed only two other narcotics cases, at the time of this writing, in
which garlic was mentioned: United States v. Lee, 914 F.2d 264, 1990 WL 130703 (9th Cir. 1990)
(unpublished disposition) (The court mentioned in its summary of the facts that "a bag containing
garlic" was found in a metal box containing methamphetamine. The court did not speculate as to the
reason garlic was there.); United States v. Olivier-Becerril, 861 F.2d 424 (5th Cir. 1988) (In discussing the issue of whether Olivier-Becerril knew that cocaine was hidden in a secret compartment in a
vehicle, the court noted, "He knew that coffee was in the trunk; coffee is sometimes used to mask the
odor of narcotics. A fresh garlic wreath was also there.").
126. Brief for Respondent Michener, supra note 67, at 7 (quoting transcript of the August 4,
1992, Suppression Hearing at 20).
127. Justice Cardine does allude to the standard in his dissent:
The trial court, however, which held the suppression hearing, heard the evidence and observed the witnesses, determined that the suspicions observed by Officer Dyer came after

he had summoned the canine unit. This finding is not clearly erroneous. Officer Dyer had

https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/land_water/vol30/iss1/13

16

Moats: Search & (and) Seizure - The Clash between the Fourth Amendment a
1995

CASENOTES

"are not disturbed on appeal unless a clear abuse of discretion is demonstrated. "'I Findings of fact on motions to suppress are not disturbed
unless "clearly erroneous," and the reviewing court should view the
evidence "in the light most favorable to the district court's determination."'I Because the trial judge had the opportunity to observe Dyer's
demeanor while testifying, the court should have viewed his testimony
in the "light most favorable" to the judge's finding. The court has
relied in past cases on the trial judge's opportunity to see "first hand
the demeanor and expressions of the witnesses," 3 ' as opposed to its
own review of "the cold words of the transcript of testimony."' 3' Observance of its past practice should have led the court to resolve such a
close call in favor of Michener and Welch.
Instead, the court ignored its own standard of review."' While its
reasons for doing so are not clear, it is distinctly possible the court succumbed to the temptation to ignore constitutional protections because convicted criminals were seeking the shelter of the Constitution in this case.
Courts feel pressured to "provide the tools necessary to wage an effective
battle in the war on drugs. ""' 3 Courts buckling under that pressure tend to
accept profiles that seem "to encompass every possible characteristic that
one can observe a human being to possess or exhibit." "3Justice Marshall
no reasonable articulable facts upon which he could have formed a reasonable suspicion at
the time he stopped and detained respondents. This officer relied on a "drug courier profile" and a hunch, that is all. It was insufficient.
Welch, 873 P.2d at 606.
128. Wilson v. State, 874 P.2d 215, 218 (Wyo. 1994). The 10th Circuit has a similar standard
of review:
We are mindful that at a hearing on a motion to suppress, the credibility of the witnesses
and the weight given to the evidence, as well as the inferences and conclusions drawn
therefrom, are matters for the trial judge. However, the ultimate determination of reasonableness under the Fourth Amendment is a question of law which we review de novo.
Fernandez, 18 F.3d at 876. (Citations omitted).
129. Wilson, 874 P.2d at 218. The court explains its deference to the trial judge by pointing out
that he or she has the "opportunity to: assess the credibility of the witnesses; the weight given the evidence; and make the necessary inferences, deductions and conclusions .... " Id.
130. Lawrence v. Lawrence, 628 P.2d 542, 545 (Wyo. 1981).
131. Id. The court said:
We must not forget that when we examine the cold words of the transcript of testimony,
we do not have the benefit of how the trial judge sees and hears the witness-the pitch of
the voice, facial changes, the movement in the witness-all of which may tell a separate
story, to be given credence.
Id.
132. Ironically, in a 1991 case, the court reinstated a municipal court conviction reversed by the same
district judge, and rebuked the judge for "considering the case de novo instead of applying the appropriate
appellate standard of review." City of Laramie v. Hysong, 808 P.2d 199, 205 (Wyo. 1991).
133. Michael R. Cogan, Comment, The Drug Enforcement Agency's Use of Drug Courier Profiles: One Size Fits All, 41 CATH. U. L. REtV. 943, 972 (1992).
134. Id. at 973.
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believed that even the highest court in the land was not immune from this
temptation.135 Noting that nothing about Sokolow's conduct suggested
with reasonable specificity that criminal activity was afoot, Justice Marshall said: "The majority's hasty conclusion to the contrary serves only to
indicate its willingness, when drug crimes or antidrug policies are at
issue, to give short shrift to constitutional rights." 36
A dissent" 7 by Justice Thomas in the Wilson case advocates that the
courts take the position that Marshall condemns in Sokolow. Tacit acceptance
of Justice Thomas' reasoning by the court in Welch offers a possible explanation for the court's willingness to ignore its standard of review in the case. In
Wilson, Justice Thomas urged the court not to follow the lead of "more
permissive tribunals" in unnecessarily reversing criminal convictions due to
constitutional technicalities.' He asserted that constitutional principles are a
means to the well-being of society, and they should not be allowed to interfere with that well-being when it is threatened by crime and drugs. 139 He
warned that reversals of criminal convictions on the premise of protecting
rights have contributed to the development of a society in which "violence
stalks our streets and fear permeates our neighborhoods. Every decision that
tightens the cuffs with which we shackle our law enforcement officers contributes to such evolution.'

*

Justice Thomas appears to contend that Americans must destroy
what they have in order to protect it. Privacy is dear to Americans, and
they should not have to sacrifice that value in order to protect themselves
against crime. The United States Supreme Court has rightly rejected the
approach espoused by Justice Thomas. In Almeida-Sanchez v. United
States, the Court acknowledged, "The needs of law enforcement stand in
constant tension with the Constitution's protections of the individual
against certain exercises of official power. It is precisely the predictability
of these pressures that counsels a resolute loyalty to constitutional safeguards."' 4' The Court in Terry continued in that spirit in finding:

135. Sokolow, 490 U.S. at 17. (Marshall, J., dissenting).
136. Id.
137. Wilson, 874 P.2d at 226-30.
138. Id. at 228. Justice Thomas argued, "In assuming our proper role of assisting in the protection of the rights of the citizens of Wyoming to be secure in their persons and property, this court
should not follow the lead of more permissive tribunals in endeavoring to discover academic technicalities to justify reversing criminal convictions." Id.
139. Id. Justice Thomas states that his analysis "is based upon the premise that the application
of constitutional principles is not an end in itself but a means to an end. Invoking constitutional principles as an end in itself is a purely academic approach." Id.
140. Id.
141. Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266, 273 (1973).
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[E]xperience has taught that [the rule excluding evidence gained
through unconstitutional means] is the only effective deterrent to
police misconduct in the criminal context, and that without it the
constitutional guarantee against unreasonable searches and seizures would be a mere "form of words." The rule also serves
another vital function- "the imperative of judicial integrity." 42
Courts need not cast aspersions on police integrity to see the need
for neutral scrutiny. If an officer's "subjective good faith alone were the
test, the protections of the Fourth Amendment would evaporate, and the
people would be 'secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects only
in the discretion of the police.'""43
Justice Brennan reminds us of a fundamental consideration that is often
forgotten in the debate over the propriety of reversing criminal convictions
because constitutional rights were violated. The Founding Fathers "did not
enact the Fourth Amendment to further the investigative powers of the authorities, however, but to curtail them."'" Judges should not take it upon
themselves to change that. As Justice Douglas concluded in his dissent in
Teriy, any gutting of the protection against unreasonable searches and seizures "should be the deliberate choice of the people through a constitutional
amendment"145 and not accomplished by judicial fiat.
Some may react to such statements by calling for a ballot and professing their desire to unshackle the police. The old parental admonition
would seem appropriate: "Be careful what you wish for, you might get
it." If people sharing the belief that the Fourth Amendment is outmoded
were to triumph, they would soon regret their choice. The protection
against unreasonable searches and seizures goes to the core of what it
means to be free. That fact was fresh on Justice Jackson's mind when he
wrote the following soon after returning from the Nuremberg trials:
These [Fourth Amendment rights], I protest, are not mere
second-class rights but belong in the catalog of indispensable

142. Terry, 392 U.S. at 12-13 (quoting Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961) and Elkins v.
United States, 364 U.S. 206 (1960)).

143. Terry, 392 U.S. at 22 (quoting Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 97 (1964)).
144. Sharpe, 470 U.S. at 719 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
145. Terry, 392 U.S. at 38. Justice Douglas concluded his dissent in dramatic fashion:
Yet if the individual is no longer to be sovereign, if the police can pick him up whenever they do not like the cut of his jib, if they can "seize" and "search" him in their discretion, we enter a new regime. The decision to enter it should be made only after a full
debate by the people of this country.
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freedoms. Among deprivations of rights, none is so effective in
cowing a population, crushing the spirit of the individual and
putting terror in every heart. Uncontrolled search and seizure is
one of the first and most effective weapons in the arsenal of every
arbitrary government.146
CONCLUSION
The Wyoming Supreme Court must forget that its action in a particular search and seizure case might unlock the jail door for a drug
trafficker. The court should set standards for reasonable suspicion that
will take into account the innocent and guilty alike. The holding in Welch
not only affected the fates of Welch and Michener, but it also weakened
the constitutional protections afforded travelers who may quite innocently
fit a peace officer's generalized idea of a drug trafficker. The court,
therefore, should not have ignored its standard in reviewing evidentiary
rulings. The trial judge's factual findings were not clearly erroneous, and
his decision to suppress the evidence was not an abuse of his broad discretion. The court should have stepped aside and deferred to the trial
judge in his acknowledged role as the first and best defense against unconstitutional intrusions . 47
BRUCE T. MOATS

146. Brinegar, 338 U.S. at 180 (Jackson, J., dissenting).
147. The United States Supreme Court has emphasized the vital role judges play as a buffer
between private citizens and government power:
The scheme of the Fourth Amendment becomes meaningful only when it is assured
that at some point the conduct of those charged with enforcing the laws can be subjected to
the more detached, neutral scrutiny of a judge who must evaluate the reasonableness of a
particular search or seizure in light of the particular circumstances.
Terry, 392 U.S. at 21.
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